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Abstract: This paper engages the concept of transnational law (TL) in a way 
that goes beyond the by now accustomed usages with regard to the 
development of legal norms and the observation of legal action across 
nation-state boundaries, involving both state and nonstate actors. The 
concept of TL can serve to illustrate a much further-reaching set of 
developments in norm creation and legal regulation. TL is here understood 
not only as a body of legal norms, but it is also employed as a 
methodological approach to illustrate common and shared challenges and 
responses to legal regulatory systems worldwide. In the case of corporate 
governance, TL captures the specific regulatory mix of formal, hard, public 
regulation, on the one hand and of informal, soft, private regulation, on the 
other, that characterizes the contemporary evolution of corporate governance 
norms. Corporate governance norms give testimony of an ongoing search for 
answers to persisting problems in the organization of the firm, the 
distribution of power between shareholders, stakeholders, and the firm, as 
well as the responsibility of the corporation to its environment while—at the 
same time—reflecting on fundamental changes of the nature of norm 
creation and legal interpretation. While this approach is likely already to 
undermine some of the contentions regarding a universal convergence of 
corporate governance systems towards an outsider-control, shareholder-
value-maximization model at the “end of history of corporate law,” its risks 
lie in the misappropriation of the described processes of private ordering as 
processes of natural evolution. After all, the shift away from formal law 
making to processes of societal self-regulation—as reflected in the rise of 
corporate governance codes, standards, best practices or, in the area of labor 
law, of codes of conduct and core labor rights—might turn out to be a less 
fortunate answer to the redistributive and participatory questions that are 
posed when one views corporate governance in the context of a larger set of 
welfare state norms, comprising not only company law and securities 
regulation, but also labor and employment law, industrial relations, and 
insolvency law. Eventually, a careful study of the transformation of the 
process of law making and rule enforcement suggests the necessity of taking 
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a broader view on corporate governance than is often the case. Seen against 
the background of a globalization of economic activity, capital flows, and the 
erosion of many protective norms and rights—in particular in the area of 
labor law—the study of transnational corporate governance can contribute to 
a better understanding of the regulatory challenges of a globalized market 
economy.  
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THE PARALLEL WORLDS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND LABOR LAW 
Peer Zumbansen 
INTRODUCTION 
The transterritorialization of company activities that span the globe—
with widespread subsidiaries, interfirm networks, and extreme forms of 
outsourcing of formerly corporate-owned processes—challenges traditional 
regulatory aspirations of nation-states and other political bodies.1 Corporate 
activity is disintegrated into a multitude of decentralized, and yet connected, 
processes. This state reflects on the dramatic changes of the nature and 
structure of the private business corporation and of the marketplace in which 
it operates. With corporate activity encompassing the production of cars, 
tank ships, microchips, medical and spaceflight software, precision weapons, 
and throw-away toys to help uninventive hosts of children’s birthday parties, 
no end is in sight to a feverishly progressing diversification of products and 
methods for their branding, assembly, and dissemination.2 Dell, the computer 
firm, made use of the “three new freedoms” in the 1990s—to conduct 
business without borders, to conduct business “unburdened by any sense of 
responsibility to any community or any individual,” and to conduct it in the 
wake of a technological revolution that allowed for an unprecedented 
extension of the assembly line3—exemplifying a much larger trend, whose 
sources and driving forces date to at least a century prior. The “Dell Effect” 
describes a computer manufacturing and sales unit that can custom assemble 
                                            
 1. Peter Hertner, Corporate Governance and Multinational Enterprise in Historical 
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND 
EMERGING RESEARCH 41 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); see Mark Herkenrath & Volker 
Bornschier, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Still the Same Harmful 
Effects in an Increasingly Globalized World Economy?, 9 J. WORLD-SYSTEMS RES. 105 
(2003). 
 2. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (1st 
Picador USA ed. 2001) (1999). 
 3. BARRY C. LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION 
103 (2005). 
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and deliver computers anytime and anywhere in the world,4 that has 
dramatically cut down on inventory times and, much like Walmart, 
integrated its thousands of business partners, suppliers, assemblers, and 
transporters in a worldwide logistical web. It must today be seen to embody 
much of what Manuel Castells rightly coined the “Network Society,”5 and 
what others refer to as the “Digital Revolution.”6 The stories are no less than 
breathtaking: 
As other companies struggled to reorganize their internal 
operations, to contract out more work, to blend in more 
overseas sources of supply, [Michael] Dell focused on using 
the latest in supply-chain management software to coordinate 
the movement of components from wherever he could get 
them. Almost entirely unrestrained by existing in-house 
component-manufacturing operations, Dell concentrated 
instead on developing a system that could track individual 
items—no matter where they were made—more tightly and 
efficiently than was possible even in the most perfectly 
integrated of old-line companies. For Dell, manufacturing was 
not making things, it was buying and moving and assembling 
and delivering things that other companies had 
manufactured.7 
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel have identified the enormous social, 
economic, and political consequences of Taylorist scientific production 
                                            
4. See DELL INC., THE DELL EFFECT: EXPANDING ACCESS AND CHANGING THE WORLD 1–2 
http://www.dell.com/downloads/global/corporate/delleffect/DellEffect.pdf; Dell Global 
Product Development, http://www1.us.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/innovation/en/cto 
_product_development?c=us&l=en&s=corp (detailing Dell’s innovation centers in Texas, 
India, China, Taiwan, and Malaysia). 
 5.   MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE: THE 
RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. 2000). 
6. JACK CHALLONER, THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION (2002). 
7. LYNN, supra note 3, at 102. 
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forms, 8 standardization of work tasks, and the construction of markets for 
mass consumer goods through the technological revolution in the nineteenth 
century as the “Second Industrial Divide.”9 These phenomena seem mere 
precursors to present developments, the impact of which we recognize as still 
more radical and untamable than the former. While the welfare state arose10 
out of the dire situation of rural desertion, urban poverty, and industrial 
workers’ hardship,11 no such utopian model offers itself at the outset of the 
twenty-first century. With the Western welfare state struggling to rediscover 
its institutional promise for the future,12 the answers to the regulatory 
challenges of globalized markets are increasingly sought elsewhere. 
In this new globally competitive economy, the exploited 
human beings with whose dignity and welfare the founders of 
labour laws were concerned, are now most likely to be found 
in sweat shops in South Asia or the Caribbean producing 
clothes for supermarkets in Europe and America; or in slum 
factories in East Asia assembling circuit boards for 
transnational IT companies.13 
                                            
8. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: 
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 45–46 (1984). The term Taylorism goes back to the 
particular form of mass production conceptualized in FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911). 
9. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 8, at 6. 
10. See Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 48 WORLD POL. 143 (1996); 
Philip Manow, Welfare State Building and Coordinated Capitalism in Japan and Germany, 
in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM 94, 95 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura 
eds., 2001). 
11. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed., Beacon Press 2001) (1944); UPTON SINCLAIR, 
THE JUNGLE (Random House 2002) (1906) (providing an account of the bleak and violent 
conditions of workers in Chicago’s stockyards in novel form). 
12. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND 
THE HISTORIANS’ DEBATE 48, 50–51, 54, 59 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen ed. and trans., 1989). 
13. BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 5–6 (2005). 
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The characterization of economic globalization as the worldwide 
interaction of global trading partners is paralleled by an unprecedented 
economic interdependence of industry branches and their respective human 
and institutional communities and stakeholders around the world. This 
interdependence results from firms relying on the cheapest labor, on export-
processing zones, and on just-in-time delivery of elements from innumerable 
places and directions.14 This highly sensitive system of interlocking 
production and delivery processes constitutes an overwhelming challenge for 
traditional conceptions of business corporations, of their relations to business 
partners, and of stakeholders, such as employees and the community in 
which a business operates. Underneath the shining layer of universally 
available standard goods, unrestrained by seasonal changes or other local 
conditions, we find a pulsating network of fine arteries connecting a 
multitude of actors’ lives, each delivered to this massive and sprawling 
machinery. The “state as machine”15 has seemingly found its master. 
The focus of this paper is on the changes in legal regulation of 
transnational corporate activity. The study of the structure of contemporary 
legal regulation is rendered difficult through the proliferation of “spaces and 
places” of norm generation.16 As a result, an exploration of the law 
applicable to domestic and global corporate activity must trespass 
disciplinary boundaries, as the norms that corporations follow (or seek to 
escape) encompass corporate law rules, the rules of taxation law and labor 
law, which together shape the regulatory environment of the contemporary 
corporation. But, such exploration must also illuminate the tension between 
the place of the business operation and the locally applied norms (“place”), 
                                            
14. See id. at 13–14. 
15. HORST DREIER, HIERARCHISCHE VERWALTUNG IM DEMOKRATISCHEN STAAT 19–36 
(1991). 
16. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE 
NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY (1998). Cf. J. Rogers Hollingsworth, New 
Perspectives on the Spatial Dimensions of Economic Coordination: Tensions Between 
Globalization and Social Systems of Production, 5 REV. OF INT'L POL. ECON. 482, 487 
(1998). See also Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered 
State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 401, 403–04, 426 (2001); Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory 
Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law, 12 EUR. L. J. 
(forthcoming 2006). 
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and the decentered reality of the corporation and the norms that are emerging 
to address this delocalized phenomenon of corporate activity (“space”). 
While the political economy of domestic corporate and labor regulation is 
still characterized by contested traditions of institutional and political 
heritage and disciplinary boundaries and power,17 the regulatory 
environment of corporations and laborers operating on and for global 
markets increasingly incorporates distinctly transnational elements. States or 
international organizations are not the sole authors of laws and binding 
norms.18 Domestic statutory and case law (especially in the field of labor 
law) is complemented by a proliferation of “soft law,” corporate governance 
codes, codes of conduct, best practice guidelines, and standards. Meanwhile, 
domestic labor law programs and international labor law face the challenge 
and competition of transnational labor norms, generated by both public and 
private norm authors that operate with little regard to political and 
geographical borders.19 This proliferation and hybridization of norms in the 
areas of labor law and corporate law raises multiple questions as to the legal 
nature of these norms, their authorship, and their enforceability. In a brilliant 
analysis of this challenge, Adelle Blackett wrote in the Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies a few years ago: 
Workers in EPZs [export processing zones] are thrust into the 
post-modern system of just-in-time flexible accumulation as 
                                            
17. See generally Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies, 
in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 71 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
18. Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, 57 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 
[ARSP] 1 (1971) (F.R.G.); See Gunther Teubner, Review Essay, Breaking Frames: The 
Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 149–50 (1997); Peer 
Zumbansen, Die vergangene Zukunft des Völkerrechts, 34 Kritische Justiz [KJ] 46 (2001) 
(F.R.G.) (identifying the absence of a hierarchy of norms in the global sphere). 
19. See HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 69–87. See generally the discussion between Philip Alston 
and Brian Langille on the viability of the ILO regime and the merits of core labor rights and 
standards: Philip Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the 
International Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457 (2004) [hereinafter Alston, 
Core Labour Standards]; Brian A. Langille, Core Labour Rights – The True Story (Reply to 
Alston), 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409 (2005); Philip Alston, Facing up to the Complexities of the 
ILO’s Core Labour Standards Agenda, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 467 (2005) [hereinafter Alston, 
Facing up]. 
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they enter the deterritorialized legal order of the multinational 
enterprises, living and producing their norms. Yet, they do so 
in particular places that may harken back to the Dickensian 
conditions of nineteenth-century industrialization.20 
Underscoring the importance of an astute analysis of the place of 
regulation against the background of the larger dimensions of economic and 
regulatory spaces to open up the local framework, she notes later: 
[B]y explicitly considering the importance of place, corporate 
codes can broaden the discussion of labor rights to address the 
frequent inability of developing countries and transition 
economies to provide functional labor inspection and dispute 
resolution services, not to mention suitable schools.21 
The need for such inquiry seems obvious given the evidence of the 
detrimental effect of deregulated labor markets on workers’ conditions, 
employment hours and protection, wage levels, and training.22 In light of the 
current state of labor law regulation on the domestic and international level, 
attention has increasingly turned to transnational norms of labor regulation.23 
But, skepticism rightly prevails regarding the quality of self-regulatory 
regimes as embodied in corporate codes of conduct or core labor standards.24 
This calls for a comprehensive study and exploration of the conditions 
that shape contemporary employment—within domestic markets as well as 
in developing countries and crucially delegalized export processing zones. 
                                            
20. Blackett, supra note 16, at 405. 
21. Id. at 431. 
22. HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 17. Contra MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 220–
48 (2004). 
23. ROGER BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUCCI, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR STANDARDS: 
THE SOFT LAW TRACK (2004); JILL MURRAY, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND 
LABOUR STANDARDS, http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/jill.htm 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
24. HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 11 (“Behind the paper tigers of laws and codes of conduct, is 
the thriving jungle of the market.”). “Private corporate codes exist because of the absence of 
an enforceable internationally agreed labour regime.” Id. at 72. 
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Whether or not a transnational labor regime will deliver in the hopes for a 
better and more effective protection of the rights of workers in today’s global 
economy depends to a large degree on its concrete legal structure. It seems 
evident that the transnationalization of labor law bears many commonalities 
with the global reach of corporate governance norms, in particular with 
regard to the hybridization of the applicable rules into an intricate mixture of 
hard and soft law, of statutory norms, and of self-regulatory regimes. At the 
same time, the concerns of labor lawyers will continue to differ dramatically 
from those of today’s corporate lawyers and corporate law scholars. The dire 
reality of contemporary labor law, embedded in a seemingly universal loss of 
terrain for both political leverage and scholarly influence, testifies to the 
field’s state of siege. As Douglas Branson remarked, 
Worker exploitation, degradation of the environment, 
economic imperialism, regulatory arbitrage, and plantation 
production efforts by the growing stable of gargantuan 
multinationals, whose power exceeds that of most nation 
states, is far higher on the global agenda than is convergence 
in governance.25 
It is against these regimes’ different prospects for the future that the 
inquiry into the transnationalization of corporate and labor norms needs to be 
conceptualized. Hence, the study of what might be understood as an 
emerging transnational law of corporate governance has to focus on the 
various existing regulatory frameworks for business corporations on the 
domestic, transnational, and international level. Conceptualizing the norms 
that shape the “constitution of the firm” as a transnationally evolving body of 
law26 helps to illuminate the embeddedness of firms in layers of rules.27 
                                            
 25. Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in 
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 326 (2001). 
 26. See CHRISTINE A. MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ch. 3 (2004). 
 27. See generally ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1965); Robert Boyer & J. Rogers Hollingsworth, From 
National Embeddedness to Spatial and Institutional Nestedness, in CONTEMPORARY 
CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 433 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert 
Boyer eds., 1997); Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem 
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985); Peer Zumbansen, The Privatization of 
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Business corporations and the norms that govern them must be understood in 
the context of their origin and development in specific systems of 
production28 as well as in legal and socioeconomic cultures.29 The 
transnational law of corporate governance encompasses the hard law that 
governs the corporation through domestic company law, securities 
regulation, tax law, or labor law, on the one hand, and the soft law of 
voluntary codes of conduct, corporate governance codes, human rights 
codes, and core labor standards, on the other. 
As the latter present a dramatic challenge to traditional understandings of 
law making, an analysis of voluntary codes of conduct further illuminates the 
complex nature of the regulated and self-regulating firm. But the inquiry into 
the transnationalization of corporate and labor norms reveals a much less 
natural or unavoidable development than is often thought. Instead of 
understanding the new politics of labor as illuminating and assessing an 
inevitable development, quasi-naturally accompanying the globalization of 
commercial activity, this process must be studied with much closer attention 
to the political constellations in which choices are made.30 The move of legal 
analysis beyond the confines of the nation-state must incorporate the lessons 
learned from previous studies of regulatory change in domestic welfare-state 
                                                                                                                
Corporate Law?: Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self-Regulation, 
JURIDIKUM (F.R.G.), Mar. 2002, at 32. 
 28. See SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (2005); MICHAEL 
STORPER & ROBERT SALAIS, WORLDS OF PRODUCTION: THE ACTION FRAMEWORKS OF THE 
ECONOMY (1997). 
 29. See generally Richard Whitley, The Social Construction of Economic Actors: 
Institutions and Types of Firms in Europe and Other Market Economies, in THE CHANGING 
EUROPEAN FIRM 39 (Richard Whitley & Peer Hull Kristensen eds., 1996); RICHARD 
WHITLEY, DIVERGENT CAPITALISMS (2d ed. 2000); Robert Boyer, Hybridization and Models 
of Production: Geography, History, and Theory, in BETWEEN IMITATION AND INNOVATION 
23 (Robert Boyer et al. eds., 1998); SYSTEMS OF PRODUCTION: MARKETS, ORGANISATIONS 
AND PERFORMANCE (Brendan Burchell et al. eds., 2003). See also MARK J. ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994). 
 30. See Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law, in 
LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 3 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002); Joanne 
Conaghan, Women, Work, and Family: A British Revolution?, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 53. 
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regimes, in order to ask the right questions when confronted with the 
plethora of self-regulatory norms, codes of best practice, codes of conduct, 
and core standards. In addition, the comparative view on both corporate and 
labor law shall allow bridging some of the bifurcations that characterize the 
commonly separated fields of law. While, in labor law, a distinct critique of 
self-regulation and an erosion of enforceable rights have been unfolding over 
the past few years,31 the same cannot be said of contemporary mainstream 
scholarship in the area of corporate law. Here, the discourse seems to be 
predominantly determined by ongoing concerns with issues of “ownership 
and control” and an alleged convergence of corporate governance rules 
toward a shareholder-value maximization model.32 After important studies 
exploring the political economy of the corporation,33 the focus on the law-
making aspects of corporate norms is much more recent.34 Only from this 
perspective can we arrive at a more precise and adequate picture of the role 
of law in shaping the constitution of the firm. Deciphering this role is 
important in view of the manifold functions that today’s firms perform on the 
domestic and the transnational level. These functions of the firm include: the 
furthering of prosperity for shareholders and stakeholders such as employees, 
                                            
 31. See H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1996); 
Manfred Weiss, The Future of Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and as a 
Practical Tool, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 169 (2003); Alston, Core Labour Standards, 
supra note 19; Philip Alston, Labour Rights as Human Rights: The Not So Happy State of 
the Art, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Simon Deakin, 
Social Rights in a Globalized Economy, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 25. 
But see Langille, supra note 19. 
 32. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (subsequently republished in different collections). For an 
early, quite vehement critique of the Hansmann & Kraakman article, see Branson, supra 
note 25, at 330–31 (calling it a “chauvinistic statement of the Americanocentric convergence 
thesis.”). 
 33. Walther Rathenau, Vom Aktienwesen (1917); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century 
Capitalist Revolution (1954); Shonfield, supra note 27. 
 34. Theodor Baums, Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making 
Process of a Very New Nature—Interview with Professor Dr. Theodor Baums, GERMAN 
L.J., July 16, 2001, http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43; John W. 
Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate 
Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC'Y 572 (2000); Zumbansen, supra note 27. 
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creditors, and the community at large; guaranteeing employee pension 
plans;35 investing in research and development; and disseminating resulting 
knowledge, as well as engaging in the protection of the environment or 
observing cultural requirements and human rights standards in the firm’s 
operation in various political contexts. In addition, as firms offer themselves 
as prime agents of technological innovation, their role within regional and 
national economies is of utmost importance under conditions of global 
competition. Noting a recently heightened awareness among policy makers 
in Canada, the United States, and the European Union of the need to 
strengthen the innovative potential of their economies, it is mandatory to 
better understand the role of business corporations and the potential for, but 
also the shortcomings of, regulatory approaches in this respect.36 
The first Part of this article explores the different genealogies and 
trajectories of corporate law and labor law as the two great, opposed building 
blocks of the “political economy of the firm.”37 In the context of this article, 
the focus in Part II.A. will be on the different regulatory foci of corporate 
and labor law and their respective images and concepts of the corporation, its 
stakeholders, and its role in society. This first comparison of the different 
worlds of corporate and labor law serves as a prerequisite for the closer 
                                            
 35. See Donald J. Johnston, Foreword to ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 3–4 (rev. ed. 2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (“In today’s economies, interest in 
corporate governance goes beyond that of shareholders in the performance of individual 
companies. As companies play a pivotal role in our economies and we rely increasingly on 
private sector institutions to manage personal savings and secure retirement incomes, good 
corporate governance is important to broad and growing segments of the population.”). 
 36. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 35, at 13–14 (“The Principles are 
evolutionary in nature and should be reviewed in light of significant changes in 
circumstances. To remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must innovate and 
adapt their corporate governance practices so that they can meet new demands and grasp 
new opportunities. Similarly, governments have an important responsibility for shaping an 
effective regulatory framework that provides for sufficient flexibility to allow markets to 
function effectively and to respond to expectations of shareholders and other stakeholders.”). 
 37. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY (J.E. Parkinson et al. eds., 
2000). The inquiry into the no less important political economy of taxation law in shaping 
the regulatory environment of the firm will be pursued in a subsequent paper. See, e.g., Neil 
Brooks, The Logics, Policy and Politics of Tax Law, in MATERIALS ON CANADIAN INCOME 
TAX LAW (Tim Edgar et al. eds., 12th ed., Carswell 2000). 
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scrutiny of the changes in regulatory method that have been taking place in 
both fields. The changes in corporate law, through the comparative study and 
impact of foreign corporate governance rules and through the issuance of 
corporate governance recommendations and standards through private and 
quasi-public bodies on the domestic and international level, have nurtured 
belief in a universal convergence of corporate governance rules. And yet, 
contestations remain strong. This is the focus of Part II.B. of this article. The 
last Part explores the larger context of a turn to standards, recommendations, 
and corporate self-regulation against the background of international law’s 
long-standing soul-searching.38 We enter ardent debates over the viability of 
legal regulatory frameworks in an increasingly globalized society.39 Whether 
it is possible to transport and translate our understanding and experiences of 
the rule of law and “fora, forms and processes” of legal deliberation40 into 
the realms of disintegrated social activity goes to the heart of our reliance on 
law as a means of social regulation. But, instead of suggesting that the turn to 
codes of conduct be read as the swan song of the rule of law, the concluding 
part highlights the stakes of corporate self-regulation and the rise of labor 
standards in light of the fragility of rights and enforcement procedures in a 
complex and fragmented global society. 
                                            
 38. On the ongoing introspection among international lawyers on their field, see Manley O. 
Hudson, The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 
419 (1925); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition 
and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 113 (2005). 
 39. See the breathtaking concluding chapter in NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL 
SYSTEM (Ziegert Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004). See also 
Luhmann, supra note 18. More recently in this context, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & 
Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation 
of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1003 (2004) (“Neither doctrinal formulas of legal 
unity, nor the theoretical ideal of a norm hierarchy, nor the institutionalization of 
jurisdictional hierarchy provide an adequate means to avoid such conflicts.”). On the theme 
of a non-hierarchical, global legal order, see Peer Zumbansen, Beyond Territoriality: The 
Case of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB 
No. 4/2005), available at 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/FileStore/
ConWEBFiles/Filetoupload,16448,en.pdf . On Luhmann’s concept of law as a globalizing 
social system, see Peer Zumbansen, Notes on the Fragility of Law: A Review Essay on 
Niklas Luhmann's Law as a Social System, 17 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2006). 
 40. Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in 
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986). 
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I. STUDYING CORPORATIONS, THEIR STAKEHOLDERS, AND THEIR LAW 
Corporate law and labor law inhabit two distinct and separate worlds of 
legal thought—and of political reality. Corporate governance codes and 
corporate codes of conduct endorsing labor norms41 mirror the existing 
tension inherent to different groups in the legal and economic fields. Both 
groups of actors are protagonists in different narratives describing the reality 
of globally integrated markets and the new economy. In one narrative, we 
find contract and property considerations turning on management control. 
For corporate law, its primary regulatory focus is on shareholder value. With 
regard to the regulatory context, corporate law is embedded within a larger 
programmatic frame where structural considerations regarding the business 
corporation—“legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, 
delegated management . . . and investor ownership”42—are perceived to be 
akin to policies focusing on investor protection, financial stability, and “good 
governance.”43 
In contrast, the labor law narrative illustrates an increasingly endangered 
range of rights for workers and the need to adapt the applicable legal regime 
to the economic realities that have come upon us.44 As the economic 
environment continues to change dramatically, allowing for a radical 
flexibility of capital and work, workers are threatened by the loss of many of 
their institutional and regulatory safeguards. Attempts to reinvigorate labor 
rights and worker protection are hampered by international pressure to 
provide attractive economic environments. Where rights for workers are 
demanded by developing countries, these nations fear yet another 
protectionist backlash from developed states. 
                                            
 41. See the excellent introduction on the ILO’s website. Corporate Codes of Conduct, 
http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 
2006). 
 42. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1 (2004). 
 43. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR 
MARKETS 55–74 (2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/ch3.pdf; 
Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199 (2004). 
 44. See the debate between Alston and Langille: Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 
19; Langille, supra note 19; Alston, Facing up, supra note 19. 
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It can be shown, however, that these narratives actually do not describe 
separate worlds but are instead two sides of the same coin. Both tell the story 
of powerful changes in societal governance through law. Beyond the 
conflation of different “models of democracy,”45 there exists a crucial 
parallel between the regulatory challenges faced by public actors, such as 
states and international bodies and the ever-growing freedoms of 
transnationally operating corporations. The transformations in governance 
brought about by the denationalization of societal activity,46 by technological 
advances, and by an irreversible interpenetration of public and private sites 
of power and identity,47 are reproducing themselves in our debates over 
substance (What is the corporation? Whose firm is it?) and procedure (How 
do norms come about? Are codes law?). Central to both narratives are 
changes in their respective legal regime. But, while these legal 
transformations can be understood as reacting to similar challenges—the 
difficulty of extending nation-states’ regulatory reach to foreign operating 
business organizations, a proliferation of norm-making actors and levels, and 
a complex coexistence of hard law and soft law48—there remains a great 
need to further explore these transformations of legal regulation. While labor 
law now needs to find its institutional and normative holding in globally 
integrated markets and a drastically changed regulatory environment, 
corporate governance seems to reflect the bright side of the recent new 
                                            
 45. David Held, Models of Democracy (2d ed. 1997); Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy 
(2000); Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in The Inclusion of the 
Other 239 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998). 
 46. See generally Luhmann, supra note 18; LUHMANN, supra note 39; Saskia Sassen, 
Globalization or Denationalization?, 10 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 1 (2003). 
 47. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC'Y REV. 719 (1973); Sally Engle Merry, 
Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357 
(1992); Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in 
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Peer Zumbansen, 
Transnational Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan Smits ed., forthcoming 
2006). 
 48. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization, and Emancipation (2002). In this vein, see Jean-Philippe Robé, Multinational 
Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic Legal Order, in Global Law Without a State, 
supra note 47, at 45, 55. 
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economy—here, everyone drives a BMW and concludes business deals over 
the Internet. The perceived changes in norm production in corporate 
governance evoke an apparently altogether different and dissociated 
discourse on the chances and dynamics of global markets from the narrative 
of the rise and fall of labor law. 
In order to further illustrate the tension between the worlds of corporate 
governance and labor law, I will sketch some significant elements of the 
political economy of both fields and disciplines. Against this background, 
then, we can discern fundamental problems of analogizing the rise of quasi-
universal corporate governance concepts (such as shareholder-value 
maximization) with the emergence of corporate codes of conduct and core 
labor standards. While the former are representative of a far-reaching 
transformation of the rules pertaining to business organization in order to 
make business management more responsive to investor needs, the 
development of labor standards that depend on their recognition by states 
and private corporate actors and of corporate codes of conduct that remain 
enforceable only on a voluntary basis, reflects on the increasingly fragile 
standing of labor law in the global regulation of the economy. The claim to 
fame of the corporate governance movement at the beginning of the twenty-
first century might be the flipside of the longstanding deterioration of labor 
rights and an effective labor rights regime. 
A. Exploring the Geography of the “Worlds” of Corporate Governance and 
Labor Law 
1. Regulatory Framework 
a. Corporate Governance 
With regard to the policy program of corporate governance, we find an 
eternal struggle with the separation of “ownership and control.” This is not a 
new topic,49 but is one that has been powerfully exacerbated by the recent 
                                            
 49. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968). 
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financial scandals in the United States and elsewhere.50 The problem of the 
separation of ownership and control boils down to more specific inquiries 
into corporate personality and limited liability,51 managerial power, and 
minority protection.52 In light of related discussions, we can discern the 
“purpose” of the corporation to be the generation of profit for shareholders.53 
Control has always been a contested concept, invoking countervailing 
conceptual approaches; control ought to be exercised either through internal 
organization or the market, inner-firm instruments of management 
supervision with or without independent directors, or takeovers.54 While the 
latter clearly points to the embeddedness of corporate law in a wider frame 
of regulatory politics and path-dependent corporate trajectories,55 a 
microanalysis of corporate law remains restricted to an inside view of the 
corporation. Corporate law remains confined to the “ownership and control” 
model that is exclusively oriented around financial ownership. Human 
capital investment, in contrast,56 is not considered on the same level as 
                                            
 50. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Post-Enron Reflections on Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 14 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 113 (2003); Lyman Johnson, After Enron: 
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003). 
 51. See the brilliant analysis by Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The 
Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 583 (1999). For a historical background and critique, see Paddy Ireland, 
Capitalism Without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of 
the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1996). 
 52. See generally A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES (2002). 
 53. William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology 
for Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY 11 
(William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan eds., 2002). 
 54. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the 
European Corporate Governance Environment, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 49 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992). 
 55. Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options, and Governance Systems, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 165, 167–68 (Klaus J. 
Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997); see also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate 
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993). 
 56. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995). 
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financial investment. Eventually, the combination of financial transparency 
goals promoted and enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the protection of managerial prerogatives, led to a forceful 
exclusion of employees from the American concept of corporate 
governance.57 Hence, all protective policies relating to investment regularly 
address the protection of the investor. 
With corporate law’s mandate being driven and constantly refined by 
policy makers, regulators, and scholars, as well as leaders of business and 
industry associations, large corporations, public policy institutions, and 
regulatory bodies such as securities commissions, government commissions, 
and expert teams, as well as international financial institutions that promote 
goals of “good governance,” the primary focus remains on the improvement 
of corporate disclosure and of more effective firm management.58 
A final observation on the regulatory program of corporate governance is 
related to the world of corporate law scholarship and teaching.59 Corporate 
law as it is presented in textbooks and classrooms will usually exclude labor 
law, and hence, the employee. This, however, is owed less to an overriding 
sense of autonomy or even superiority as regards other fields than to the aim 
of corporate law teachers for a clear doctrinal and theoretical focus. To give 
an example: Bruce Welling writes in his influential casebook on Canadian 
corporate law: “[S]ome are outside the scope of ‘corporate law’ as such, 
having acquired a subspecialty over the years. . . . Some groups are not 
recognized in general as having a role to play in the corporation’s 
government.”60 In Robert Clark’s masterful book, we find a clear reminder to 
                                            
 57.  JOHN W. CIOFFI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, REGULATORY POLITICS, AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 9 (Comp. 
Res. in L. & Pol. Econ., Law Research Inst. Research Paper Series No. 6/2005, 2005) (“The 
American corporate governance regime embodies a complementary and mutually 
reinforcing relationship between the market-driven financial system and a legalistic, 
transparency-based regulatory regime.”), available at 
http://www.comparativeresearch.net/papers/CLPE_Vol_01_No_01_RPS_06_Cioffi.pdf. 
 58. See generally Layna Mosley, Attempting Global Standards: National Governments, 
International Finance, and the IMF's Data Regime, 10 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 331 (2003). 
 59. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 456 (2004). 
 60. Bruce Welling et al., Canadian Corporate Law 51 (2d ed. 2001). 
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his readers to include labor law in their research on corporations and 
corporate law.61 In contemporary writings, this diversity continues. In The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law, which has already become a leading reference 
work for the study of corporate law, the authors recognize labor law among 
other “non-corporate law constraints” imposed on companies.62 Labor law, 
in this description, is identified as a body of law “designed to serve 
objectives that are largely unrelated to the core characteristics of the 
corporate form.”63 In contrast, Simon Deakin, a British chaired corporate law 
professor and world-renowned labor law scholar observes: “While labour 
law and corporate governance could once have been thought as discrete areas 
for analysis, it is clear that this is no longer the case. The relationship 
between them has become both complex and paradoxical.”64 
This divergence in approaches and perspectives continues throughout the 
books written by corporate and labor law scholars, the journals they publish 
in, and the conferences they attend.65 Within the academy and the law 
school’s curriculum, corporate law is seen in concert with courses and issues 
in securities regulation and bankruptcy law, but not with labor law. Courses 
                                            
 61. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 32 (1986) (“[E]ven if your aim is not to 
understand all of law’s effects on corporate activities but only to grasp the basic legal 
‘constitution’ or make-up of the modern corporation, you must, at the very least, also gain a 
working knowledge of labor law.”); see also DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 
11 (3d ed. 1989) (regretting the omission of labor and contract law from the reach of 
corporate law studies in spite of the fact that creditors and employees “may have a lasting 
and intimate relationship with the corporation”). A very careful assessment of the 
“dilemma” of the traditional definition of corporate law (to focus primarily on business 
associations and their organizational structure) is given by FRIEDRICH KÜBLER, 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 3–4 (5th ed. 1998); a similarly cautious identification of the reach of 
corporate law—droit des affaires—is given by YVES GUYON, DROIT DES AFFAIRES 1 (12th 
ed. 2003). 
 62. Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach 17 (2004). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance and Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW: 
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE QC 79, 79 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004). 
 65. But see, e.g., the First International Conference of the Comparative Research in Law & 
Political Economy Network at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario, Can. (Oct. 20–
21, 2005), http://www.comparativeresearch.net/main.php?page=events.php. 
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are not taught in reciprocal exchange of notes or literature, and students 
rarely take both—unless it is mandatory. We are reminded of the late Abram 
Chayes’ astute observation, “The concept of Corporation has political, legal 
and social dimensions beyond the economic. But the appropriate academic 
disciplines remain largely unconcerned.”66 
Before we widen this admittedly very narrow perspective to the 
regulatory context, a few introductory remarks shall be permitted with regard 
to the regulatory program of labor law. 
b. Labor Law 
Labor law’s overriding concern is the protection of employment and 
employees. Its focus is on the employment contract, workplace safety, 
working hours, and minimum wages. Subsequently, its focus is on 
representation, whether on the firm level (“works councils”) or in the context 
of collective bargaining. The historical and institutional memory of 
representation and conflict in labor law is long, and it clearly illuminates the 
painful trajectories of rights discovery, protection, and erosion through the 
rise of the industrial revolution and its ramifications and successors.67 In 
many accounts, labor law is today in crisis, and it remains far from clear 
whether a revival is in sight.68 At the same time, labor law and workers’ 
                                            
 66. Abram Chayes, Introduction to JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION 
TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, at i (1961). 
 67. See Achim Seifert, Das Recht der Arbeit im Wandel. Paradigmen des Arbeitsvertrags in 
der neueren Geschichte des deutschen Arbeitsrechts, in 5 HANNOVERSCHE SCHRIFTEN: 
TRANSFORMATION DER ARBEIT 153 (Detlev Claussen et al. eds., 2003); Harry W. Arthurs, 
Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001); Simon Deakin, Contract of Employment: A Study 
in Legal Evolution, HIST. STUD. INDUS. REL., Spring 2001, at 1. 
 68. See generally Weiss, supra note 31. But see H.W. Arthurs, National Traditions in Labor 
Law Scholarship: The Canadian Case, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 645 (2002). For one of 
the most promising studies for future work, see generally ALAIN SUPIOT ET AL., BEYOND 
EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE (English 
language ed., Pamela Meadows et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1999) (originally 
published in French, as AU-DELÀ DE L'EMPLOI: TRANSFORMATION DU TRAVAIL ET DEVENIR 
DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL EN EUROPE: RAPPORT POUR LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS 
EUROPÉENNES, but rewritten in English to dispel “the impression that the analysis and 
diagnoses it contains apply mainly to France”). 
2006] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR LAW 21 
 
rights are slowly becoming part of larger corporate social responsibility 
agendas.69 Much of this debate is concerned with placing the corporation in a 
greater social context.70 Where a wider perspective on the business 
corporation is taken, labor law meets employee-ownership theories, as well 
as stakeholder capitalism models.71 
2. The Regulatory Context of Corporate Governance and Labor Law 
a. Corporate Governance 
With a view to the regulatory context in which we explore the 
purportedly separate worlds of corporate governance and labor law, we seek 
to trace the larger trends of ideology that shape both fields. We find global 
conversations about “best standards,” universal norms, and a worldwide 
convergence toward one model of corporate governance. Clearly, we are 
entering endgames of Hegelian dimensions where we hear authors 
proclaiming the “end of history” with regard to the defeat of communism72 
or the triumph of shareholder-value capitalism.73 Central to these discussions 
are national deadlocks over political conflicts resulting from path-dependent 
                                            
 69. See, e.g., Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social 
Contract, 27 J.  BUS. ETHICS 205, 208 (2000); Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, Shareholder 
Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110, 114 (2001); 
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE L.J. 443, 531–33 (2001). For a very critical stance, see H.J. Glasbeek, The Corporate 
Social Responsibility Movement—The Latest in Maginot Lines to Save Capitalism, 11 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 363, 366–67 (1988). 
 70. See generally Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 19; Alston, Facing up, supra 
note 19, at 475–77; BLANPAIN & COLUCCI, supra note 23, at 111–17; Robert O'Brien, The 
Difficult Birth of a Global Labour Movement, 7 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 514 (2000). 
 71. See GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2003); Paul Edwards et al., New Forms of Work Organization in the Workplace: 
Transformative, Exploitative, or Limited and Controlled?, in WORK AND EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS IN THE HIGH PERFORMANCE WORKPLACE 72 (Gregor Murray et al. eds., 2002); 
Teresa Ghilarducci et al., Labour’s Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of Corporate 
Governance, 24 J.L. & SOC'Y 26 (1997). 
 72. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). 
 73. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32. 
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institutional structures and trajectories.74 Thus, it comes as no surprise that 
the existential differences between different corporate law regimes are 
regularly presented as the decisive challenge to law reform.75 
Corporate law in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is 
overwhelmingly “enabling” law, with the state regulating only the 
framework and leaving the rest of the internal governance regulation to the 
firm’s constitutional statutes.76 In contrast, while in the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom only securities law is mandatory and 
federally regulated law, we find that company law regimes in Europe are 
much more regulated. For example, in Germany, most of corporate law is 
mandatory, not enabling, law.77 As already suggested in the introduction, 
however, the legislative framework of corporate law has ceased to be 
determined by domestic policy alone. And while this has occurred for several 
decades78 already, an even stronger push has taken place in the last few 
                                            
 74. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Control, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 113, 125–31 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002); 
see generally Ronald Dore et al., Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL'Y, Winter 1999, at 102; Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in 
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643–44 (1996); Peer Zumbansen, European 
Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 867, 881–82 (2004). 
 75. See, e.g., RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM 176–81 
(2000). 
 76. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 42; Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to THE 
GOVERNANCE OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 1, 4 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. 
eds., 2004) (“A recurring theme in the literature concerns the role of mandatory rules in 
statutory standard forms. In contrast with the United States, the trend in European corporate 
law has been to dismiss the benefits associated with the enabling approach too quickly, 
relying on a narrow range of techniques and mandatory rules to balance the interests of the 
various parties.”). 
 77. See Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany—System and Recent 
Developments, in ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 31 (Mats Isaksson & Rolf Skog 
eds., 1994). But see Theodor Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany, 3 J. CORP. L. 
STUD. 181, 183 (2003) (discussing the “comply or explain” principle). 
 78. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law Scene, in THE 
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 3 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 1973); 
RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS 
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years. The making of corporate law is no longer only a domestic process but 
one that unfolds in a multilevel environment of legislatures providing 
binding rules (e.g., the U.S. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002;79 the refining 
listing rules for foreign corporations on the NYSE;80 the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Corporate Governance 
Principles and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations;81 and 
numerous corporate governance codes on the domestic, international, and 
transnational level82) and nation-state governments either transposing such 
norms or complementing them with further regulatory initiatives. This 
multilevel regulatory environment is characterized by a coexistence of soft 
norms generated by quasi-public expert commissions,83 hard, statutory law, 
and by cross-national benchmarking84 of standards and norms. It is in this 
context that the remarks by the EU Commissioner for the internal market, 
Charlie McCreevy, not to invest hopes in a soon-to-come EU-wide Code of 
Corporate Governance but, instead, to promote mutual learning and 
benchmarking, deserve particular attention: 
Europe has a role to play. That role is to co-ordinate where 
possible Member States’ efforts to improve corporate 
governance practices, through changes in their national 
company law, securities law or in corporate governance 
codes. There are different traditions in different Member 
States and those should be respected, but we must avoid 
                                                                                                                
ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE 
AND THE U.S.A. 167 (1988). 
 79. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7201–7266. 
 80. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). 
 81. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 35; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
 82. See generally MALLIN, supra note 26, ch. 3; European Corp. Governance Inst., Index of 
All Codes, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php.  
 83. See, e.g., Baums, supra note 34. 
 84. Zumbansen, supra note 27, at 38. 
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unnecessary divergences which distort the single market and 
make life difficult for investors. Member States want and 
need to learn from each other’s experience. The Corporate 
Governance Forum brings together a vast amount of high-
level experience and expertise. It has a key strategic role to 
play.85 
In a more recent speech, delivered on November 17, 2005, McCreevy 
stressed the importance of this approach in light of the “different economic, 
social and legal traditions” among the EU Member States, even if he 
perceived a “market-driven trend towards convergence in Europe.”86 
Not everyone, however, shares this careful and open perspective. No less 
than the “end of history” for corporate law was proclaimed,87 just before the 
financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and others became public.88 
The forceful and yet contested89 narrative of a worldwide turn to 
shareholder-value based rules of corporate governance was brought forward 
in light of the still vivid memories of the Takeover-High in the 1980s and 
1990s, and the recovery of the U.S. economy and its citizens’ buying power 
                                            
 85. Press Release, European Union, Corporate Governance: Commissioner McCreevy 
Outlines His Views to European Forum (Jan. 20, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/78&format=PDF&aged=
1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 86. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkt. & Services, Future of the 
Company Law Action Plan (Nov. 17, 2005) (“There is no one-size-fits-all approach in 
corporate governance. The Commission should continue to encourage ‘best practices’ to 
develop according to the demands of ever more integrated markets.”) , available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/702&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Dec. 23, 2005). 
 87. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32. 
 88. For a brilliant analysis of the Enron financial scandal, see William W. Bratton, Enron 
and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002). 
 89. See Branson, supra note 25; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative 
Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 74, at 23, 24; cf. Simon Deakin & Alan Hughes, 
Comparative Corporate Governance: An Interdisciplinary Agenda, 24 J.L. & SOC'Y 1, 5 
(1997) (providing examples of nations that do not have shareholder value-based models). 
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in a dazzlingly triumphant stock market.90 At its core, this narrative contains 
a powerful endorsement of the “outsider-control” model of corporate 
governance in which control is exercised through independent directors and 
through the stock market’s scrutiny of management behavior through the 
threat of takeovers. In contrast, the story clearly marks as the losing party the 
“insider-model” of closely interconnected corporate holdings and seats on 
supervisory boards for financial institutions and industrial partners.91 The 
narrative has strong repercussions for the perception of the firm and, with it, 
the legal apparatus that is of relevance to the firm. Its strong emphasis on 
investor protection, financial transparency, and market-based control 
mechanisms increasingly shifts emphasis away from modes of internal 
corporate control. 
 1. Crisis, What Crisis? 
This is a crucial development. In the debate on the negative side of the 
account it leaves only generalizing umbrella terms that are employed to 
identify, but not explain, the insider-control model of corporate governance. 
The storyteller is thus inclined to forget certain characteristic features of the 
insider-control model that would be worth pondering for a better 
understanding of the process of corporate law evolution. The intimate 
relationship between corporate management and directors of lending 
institutions and CEOs of industrial partners in a densely woven corporate 
network—while clearly inducing many of the heavily criticized petrifying 
effects—clearly bears features of institutional stability and incremental 
growth. Among these forgotten features, we find long-term financing and the 
possibility of synergies in future-oriented research and development and 
innovation among connected firms. Furthermore, we find elements of variant 
forms of employee voice in the boardroom hidden under the insider-control 
                                            
 90. See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF 
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 147–53 (2001). 
 91. See W. Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look at 
Japan and Germany, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN AND EUROPE 227, 240–41 
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German View on Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 3, 12. 
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terminology. Especially the latter has been declared as doomed, with regard 
to the inefficiencies associated with workers’ participation in the boardroom 
and from the perspective of a property-rights-related assessment of the 
shareholder-value oriented firm. It seems clear from the point of view of a 
shareholders-as-corporate-owners model that workers ought not to be given a 
say in a corporate undertaking that is not theirs.92 
This model, however, fails to conceive of the complexly structured entity 
of the publicly held, large business corporation. It has long been 
convincingly argued that a purely property-rights-based assessment of the 
corporation cannot adequately account for the role that is played by the 
corporation in society.93 From a labor law point of view and, more 
particularly, from an interest-pluralism point of view, the corporation’s role 
is defined by the various social interests that come together in its affairs. In 
this narrative, the corporation acts as a paradoxical instrument of 
domestication for powerful class conflicts. It is against this background that 
we must read narratives of industrial relations, workers’ participation, and 
codetermination. These stories are, however, difficult to tell in times of 
economic recession and ever-more revelations of dark stains on the vest of 
“Germany Inc.”94 Most importantly, the volatile availability of global capital 
                                            
 92. See generally Mary O'Sullivan, The Innovative Enterprise and Corporate Governance, 
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REV. 32 (1999) (providing further critique of this model). 
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has induced an overwhelming pressure on corporate governance regimes 
worldwide to reform their regulatory framework to accommodate the 
institutional investors’ interests. In that context, anything even remotely 
suspicious of protecting old-boys networks and opaque financial holdings 
arouses severe critique. Washed away, however, in this great spring cleaning, 
are ongoing attempts to further experiment with and build on schemes of 
representation and workers’ voices in the corporation. It is no secret that the 
knowledge-based corporation is vitally dependent on the information input 
from its internal and external stakeholders (employees, research and 
development, universities, and research centers).95 And yet, the current 
dominant narrative of corporate governance reform remains more than 
hesitant toward embracing more stakeholder-oriented assessments of the 
firm.96 Even less do we find active endorsements of the firm as a complex 
environment of societal experiment.97 
Instead, current preoccupations in corporate law focus on management 
discretion to adopt takeover defenses without shareholder approval,98 on 
                                            
 95. See THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE GROWING IMPACT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN 
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 98. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Silja Maul & 
Athanasios Kouloridas, The Takeover Bids Directive, 5 GERMAN L.J. 355 (2004), 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol05No04/PDF_Vol_05_No_04_355-
366_Private_Maul_Kouloridas.pdf. 
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voluntary or legally mandated disclosure of management earnings,99 and on 
personal liability of company leaders for false information in securities 
markets.100 The financial scandals in the United States and elsewhere have 
not only sharpened the public’s awareness of corporate greed but have more 
powerfully refreshed the image of the corporation from a shareholder-value 
point of view. The corporate governance crisis as a “crisis in confidence,” 
which has been diagnosed since 2001 and has led to, among others, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of August 2002, is the crisis as seen from within the 
shareholder-value paradigm. This crisis is an internal analysis of the law of 
corporate governance. And yet, the programs for crisis management fail to 
illuminate the fundamental complexity of regulating the firm as an 
innovative social actor. 
In contrast, the corporate governance crisis as it is depicted by the 
erosion of employee power in corporations (German Mitbestimmung, 
unionism in Europe,  the EU’s Works Councils Directive,101 in North 
America, the shifting weight from collective bargaining to company level, 
flexibilized works council, “team production,”102 etc.103) is quite another. 
From the perspective of labor law, the corporation continues to be in crisis 
not (only) because of the robbery of shareholders by management but 
                                            
 99. See Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Executive Compensation, in 
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(importantly also) because of the continued division between the haves and 
have-nots.104 Robert Dahl’s famous-infamous comparison between political 
democracy and corporate democracy continues to haunt the perennial strive 
for representation of employees within the corporation, a struggle that has 
already been fought many decades ago under the heading of “shareholder 
democracy” and the corporation as public actor.105  
It is this undisclosed multiplication of images of the corporation and of 
its crisis that leads to the continued deadlocks in the untiring debate over the 
convergence of corporate governance standards.106 Crisis, what crisis? Joel 
Bakan’s patient, the corporation,107 is, indeed, several patients in one. For 
Bakan, it is the pathological pursuit of profit, with the crudeness of 
exploitation and profit seeking, signifying the sickness of the patient. For 
those lamenting the loss of confidence in the capital markets (President 
Bush, declaring in the spring of 2001 the need for a yet unheard and 
unspecified corporate responsibility in contrast to the much debated 
corporate social responsibility), it is the need to install truly independent 
directors to keep the watch over self-interested (sic!) managers. However, 
another patient is the firm as painted with the brushes of labor law: the utopia 
of a just society produces many angels and demons, and it remains unclear 
into which category the corporation falls. But the hospital ward for labor law 
patients is likely to be closed in the near future. 
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 2. Discourses on Nature are Discourses on Form and Substance 
The substantive debate over the “nature of the firm”108 imperceptibly 
moves into the realm of law making when we discuss the law of corporate 
governance (or of labor law) in the context of the increasing proliferation of 
codes of conduct. However, the debate over the genesis and validity of soft 
law has been, as we will see when we turn to current developments in the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and in public international law, kept 
quite distinct from the substantive debate over the corporation’s role in 
society. This is surprising, as the fierce battle over the public-private nature 
of codes of conduct, raised as regards their creation and enforceability, is so 
obviously a mirror image of the public-private nature of the corporation 
itself. But the “codes movement” is seen as a mere spin-off of a larger trend 
of corporate law autonomization, weakening the tight grasp of political 
regulation as firms escape the nation-state’s regulatory grip. 
From the perspective of the corporation’s stakeholders, corporate 
governance codes can be understood as managing (or circumventing) the 
representation of employees in supervisory committees, the size of 
supervisory committees, and the frequency of meetings. Expanding this 
perspective, “good corporate governance,” as understood by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the OECD, consists of optimal 
levels of investor protection through strict disclosure rules, effective control 
mechanisms, and the mitigation or elimination of worker involvement in the 
running of the company.109 Good corporate governance becomes part of a 
more generally conceived measure of “good governance.” The worker who 
is lost in the current paradigm of corporate governance, however, is unlikely 
to be rediscovered in the “good governance” and structural adjustment 
programs put forward by international financial institutions.110 It is against 
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this background that we need to take a closer look at the transformations that 
define the current regulatory context of labor law. 
b. Labor Law 
Labor law’s legislative and larger regulatory program has been defined 
by statutory law, case law, and soft law of both transnational and domestic 
origin. As regards labor law litigation, classically, we find examples of 
highly politicized adjudication, often greatly dependent on the presiding 
judges of highest labor courts.111 Labor law norms and rights are shaped 
through case law and statutory law, but with the persisting difficulties of 
ratifying international labor law conventions by the ILO, founded in 1919, 
emphasis and hope for a more effective regulation of corporate conduct 
increasingly are being placed on corporate codes of conduct and on 
transnational concepts such as “core labor rights.” Like the law of corporate 
governance, labor law has long come under the influence of transnational 
norms, the ILO conventions being among the most commonly known. 
It can be said that transnational labor law evolves also where no explicit, 
formal ratification of norms has taken place in the Member States. This is 
owed to the fact that labor law standards and policy considerations transgress 
geographical and political borders and thereby contribute to elements of what 
Harry Arthurs referred to as a “Labour Law Without the State.”112 This body 
or, more accurately, this web of transnational norms and standards, consists 
of norms generated by international organizations, such as the ILO, and of 
private norms issued by corporate actors and interest organizations.113 Labor 
norms included in corporate codes of conduct raise dramatic questions as to 
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the scope and limits of protection that they offer.114 This coexistence and 
overlapping of public and private regulation, and of norm generation among 
states and private actors, illustrates what Philip Jessup coined “Transnational 
Law,”115 and what others have identified as the “self-regulation of 
transnational civil society.”116 
With the legislative nature and quality of the ILO thus remaining a 
challenge, it is worthwhile to reflect on the evolution and mandate of the 
ILO. The ILO’s history of attempts to create worldwide labor rights to 
protect workers had already begun by the end of the nineteenth century. In 
fact, the ILO’s very creation gives strong testimony of institutional 
commitment and its drive towards international cooperation. The ILO’s 
subsequent dramatic history reaches a high point with the 1998 Declaration 
of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998 Declaration) that 
proclaims four core principles: (1) freedom of association and effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, (2) protection against forced 
labor, (3) elimination of child labor, and (4) freedom from discrimination.117 
While the 1998 Declaration marks a long needed institutional and theoretical 
reaction to the challenge presented to labor law, and its norms and 
institutions through the rise of the network society and the knowledge-based 
global economy,118 the 1998 Declaration marks at the same time a veritable 
“constitutional moment” in international labor law.119 The 1998 Declaration 
moves into bright light the long-standing challenges to the ILO’s tripartite 
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structure (states, employers, unions) in terms of effective negotiation and 
enforcement of its norms—which can be done only by way of ratification. 
After recalling the origins and founding principles of the organization, the 
1998 Declaration states:  
[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions 
in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of 
membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to 
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, 
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those Conventions.120 
These four principles lie at the heart of the debate over the future prospects 
of international labor law, but this debate touches upon the foundations of 
labor law as such.121 
As a consequence, the theme “Globalization and Labor Law” can be told 
as two narratives: one is the story of exhaustion, the other the story of an 
emerging new legal order. The story of exhaustion includes the creation of 
the ILO and its long and often painful history of bringing opposing nations to 
the bargaining table to sign conventions on workers’ rights, which they then 
had to ratify in their domestic parliaments. While the Cold War made for 
little progress in the ILO, as the command and control structure in 
communist countries undermined the purpose of the ILO’s unique tripartite 
structure, the ILO has been facing another challenge in recent years. With a 
steady decline in union density and relevance, unions might no longer be the 
adequate mouthpieces for a globally dispersed workforce. Meanwhile, the 
representative void is increasingly claimed by NGOs, but the following 
concerns arise: (1) the ILO fears more chaos for the already difficult 
negotiations, (2) the unions fear chaotic trends of interest representation and 
that NGOs will import many heterogeneous issues that are not altogether 
related to labor questions, while (3) the NGOs fear to give up much of their 
institutional independence and autonomy when integrated into the ILO’s 
formal negotiation structure. 
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The second law-making-related narrative begins where the institutional 
story of the ILO allegedly ends, and it is here where the problem lies. Very 
briefly, the ILO’s 1998 Declaration could mark a turning point for the 
organization, dispelling a lingering existence of often ineffective convention 
making with few concrete results or effect. Through the 1998 Declaration, 
the ILO has installed a multiparty monitoring and cooperation program, 
which is supposed to create a powerful new solidarity program with a 
practically effective side to it: countries shall work closely together when 
importing a convention into domestic law. As the agenda foresees a long-
term engagement, it follows that the ILO and  respective nations will work 
closely together to find a solution adequate to the actual conditions in a given 
country. 
 
B. The Political Economy of Regulation 
1. The Exhaustion of the State as Regulator 
It is against this multilayered background that we need to reflect on the 
potential directions that law making in corporate governance and labor law 
might take in the future. What is particularly striking about the developments 
in both fields is their parallelism regarding the transformation of the forms of 
norm generation, norm dissemination, and norm enforcement. In both fields, 
we see the emergence of norms that are no longer generated only by 
officially recognized sources of law, but also by a multitude of domestic, 
foreign, and transnational norm producers. These soft norms constitute a 
radical challenge to the state-based concept of law making that began to 
emerge in the nineteenth century and that Max Weber, among others,122 has 
so powerfully captured as the rise of “modern law.”123 In contrast to law 
originating in an official constitutional order, soft law encompasses norms 
that are not attributable to an official author of statutory norms, and which do 
not appear directly enforceable by recognized, traditional means for the 
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execution and application of legal rules. Instead, the soft law of both 
corporate governance and labor law (the latter being enshrined particularly in 
corporate codes of conduct and in core labor standards) can be read as 
reactions against incapacities on the part of the state to proceed with 
adequate legislation. The proliferation of soft law in corporate governance 
and in labor law thus offers examples of what anthropologists and legal 
sociologists have  described as “legal pluralism.”124 It consists of expert 
standards, best practices, recommendations, and principles, as well as 
standards, that can be seen to inform ongoing searches for “better law” 
without due regard to political or geographical borders. Jill Murray, a long-
time expert on the ILO and on transnational labor law, powerfully captures 
this phenomenon: 
There was a time when a student of labor law could expect to 
be introduced to three elements of the discipline: the study of 
“us,” the national labour law and institutions of the particular 
country in which the course is located, the study of “them,” 
comparative studies of the national laws and institutions of 
other countries, and the study of the “international,” usually 
confined to a consideration of the role and function of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). . . . Of course, 
beneath these comfortable divisions there was always a flow 
of influence and ideas about labour regulation both between 
national boundaries, and between nation states and the 
international body. Although the study of comparative law 
has become increasingly sophisticated, very little has been 
said about these interconnections between the spheres of 
“domestic” and “international” in relation to the regulation of 
Labor relations. In any event, this implied clear division 
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between national and international, and the identity of these 
two spheres on which the distinction was based, is no longer a 
central organising principle within the discipline of labor 
law.125 
Bob Hepple, a grand doyen of labor law, uses the term “privatising 
regulation” to describe the phenomenon of fragmented labor law norm 
creation.126 “The most striking feature of current attempts to build on the 
attempts of TNC [transnational corporations] is fragmentation.”127 The 
proliferation of norm-generating institutions and entities has received 
extensive theoretical analysis in the last three decades,128 but much more 
must be done to further illuminate the separate worlds of corporate 
governance codes and corporate codes of conduct regarding, on the one 
hand, their common origin in strained regulatory powers of domestic and 
international legislators and, on the other, their apparently different political 
agenda. 
The emergence of this unique and yet highly fragmented and 
decentralized body of norms challenges our traditional state-based 
understanding of law making, and thus provides a common ground on which 
to assess the emergence of privatized corporate law regimes,129 corporate 
codes of conduct, and core labor rights. That these forms of soft law in both 
fields cannot, however, betray their stark differences with regard to their 
underlying policy agendas becomes clear when we focus on their larger 
programmatic aspirations. 
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2006] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR LAW 37 
 
2. Corporate Governance Codes 
Corporate governance codes produced by national expert commissions or 
other large, national entities such as industry associations or corporations 
often embody condensed versions of the country’s larger body of statutory 
norms alongside recommendations that are intended to make corporate 
management more responsible to investor interests.130 While condensed 
norms are included in codes to facilitate the navigation of foreign investors 
through a complex web of applicable rules, the recommendations are usually 
meant to appeal to the management as regards the attainment of effective 
management practices, financial transparency, and responsiveness to 
shareholder interests.131 The formulation and  dissemination of corporate 
governance codes have dramatically increased over the past ten years, and 
the reasons for this development are to be sought particularly in the increased 
need for domestic corporations to attract foreign capital flows. As financial 
flows became ever more volatile, flexible, and mobile, the need for an 
increasingly investor-friendly regulatory environment began to be 
acknowledged even where firm traditions of bank-based, long-term financing 
made domestic law and policy makers take a rather skeptical or defensive 
attitude.132 Certainly, the emergence of corporate governance codes, as it 
speaks to the increased frequency of supervisory board meetings or, to take 
another issue that today is ardently disputed, the amount and the disclosure 
of management earnings,133 must be seen as potentially powerful remedies 
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CIOFFI, supra note 57. 
 133. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc. ”: The Case of 
Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497 (2002) (discussing the Americanization of corporate 
governance in Germany); Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Control and Executive 
Compensation in Large French Companies, 24 J.L. SOC’Y 85 (1997) (examining increases 
in executive pay in French firms); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
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against regulatory deadlocks and blockades in bargaining games on the 
political floor.134 In light of long-standing lines of political confrontation 
with regard to key elements of corporate governance, the inclusion of 
recommendations and best practice guidelines in corporate governance codes 
might prove an effective tool.135 
But, there should also be no doubt as to the long-term consequences of 
this form of soft law. One example shall suffice: the German corporate 
governance code, prepared by a government commission of German lawyers, 
bankers, and business experts, endorses separate preparatory meetings of the 
shareholder representatives on the supervisory board as best practice. The 
underlying justification is that important decisions should be prepared among 
the shareholder representatives so as to be presented more convincingly to 
the employee representatives at the official plenary meeting. The crux of the 
code’s recommendation, however, must be seen in the fact that such separate 
meetings have been practiced all along, despite the persistence of the 
criticism that they effectively undermined the aims of workers’ 
codetermination in supervisory boards. With the inclusion of a 
recommendation of separate preparatory meetings in the code, this practice is 
effectively endorsed as an example of “good corporate governance.” 
3. Corporate Codes of Conduct 
In contrast, corporate codes of conduct, while escaping any 
straightforward attempt at definition, regularly contain a number of ethical 
standards for corporate officers’ conduct with regard to the workforce (and 
                                                                                                                
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing 
for increased attention to the problem of excessive executive pay); see also Conyon & 
Murphy, supra note 99, at 625–46; For critiques, see William W. Bratton, The Academic 
Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (book review); 
James McConvill, Positive Corporate Governance and Its Implications for Executive 
Compensation, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1777 (2005). 
 134. See MARTIN HÖPNER, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM AND THE 
GERMAN PARTY PARADOX (Max-Plank-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 
03/4, 2003), available at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp03-4.pdf. 
 135. For a discussion of the contribution of corporate governance codes to the (improved) 
self-regulation of corporations, see ZUMBANSEN, supra note 97, ch. 3. 
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usually the environment).136 They too can be seen as emerging in the absence 
of tangible and effective regulation for a dramatically deregulated workplace 
reality. And yet, the emergence of corporate codes of conduct is driven by an 
actor, or a combination of actors, quite distinct from the one that informs the 
creation of corporate governance codes. From one perspective, corporate 
codes of conduct could be seen, in many ways, as the result of a unique form 
of public protest in a transnational civil society. The scandalizing of human 
rights abuses brought to attention by NGOs, social and political activists, or 
the press has drastically reduced the distance between these events and an 
increasingly disturbed public in formerly faraway places. Consumer protest, 
public incrimination or the initiation of protests, strikes by labor activists, 
and the branding of abusive corporate practices by various civil society 
members137 seems to be the labor-law-related equivalent to the recently 
described phenomenon of an emerging transnational human rights regime.138  
                                            
 136. Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke and Archon Fung have written several papers about 
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Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004). 
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and Around the International Trade Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 35, 73–76 (2003). 
 138. See Craig Scott & Robert Wai, Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct 
Through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of 
Transnational ‘Private’ Litigation, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 287 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); Zumbansen, supra note 39. 
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Strikingly, however, these parallels are not yet fully realized.139 
Alongside vivid attempts by international organizations such as the OECD 
and the ILO to promote a more effective observance of fundamental 
employee rights by corporations, corporations have produced corporate 
codes of conduct that include numerous pledges and voluntary commitments 
by the corporation to adhere to the self-prescribed standards.140 Their legal 
quality is hard to assess—they are as yet considered nonlegal, unenforceable, 
and predominantly voluntary self-imposed obligations.141 They raise 
important questions as to the scope of protection they effectively offer and 
the larger regulatory trend in protecting labor rights that they could be seen 
to drive forward. “Private corporate codes exist because of the absence of an 
enforceable internationally agreed labour regime.”142 Thus, while it can be 
hoped that they attain some prominence through continued pressure from 
civil society as well as from such organizations as the ILO and the OECD, 
which have undertaken extensive studies of numerous corporate codes of 
conduct,143 a number of fundamental problems remain. As voluntary codes 
of conduct, they remain in the sole discretion of the corporation; they are 
often not the product of a negotiation between employer and employees.144 
Crucially, perhaps, corporate codes of conduct embrace company-level 
regulation of work-related issues while often rejecting union involvement or 
                                            
 139.  “The international human rights movement has, until recently, paid relatively little 
attention to workers’ rights.” HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 21. 
 140. See, e.g., Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., The Implementation of the OECD 
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other forms of organized worker representation. As such, voluntary codes 
bear the danger of cutting the ties between the worker and the outside system 
of institutional safeguards. 
These last observations complement the already touched upon changes in 
the regulatory framework of labor law. To cite Adelle Blackett, 
Contemporary initiatives for setting soft law standards for 
labour must take into account the specificity of labour 
regulation, at both the national and international levels. 
Despite their apparent pragmatic potential to improve often 
deplorable conditions, such initiatives on labour are deeply 
called into question. Labour is a field once largely filled by a 
dense combination of industrial relations regulatory 
machinery at the domestic level, particularly in states that 
espoused embedded liberalism, and a plethora of international 
labour standards, meant largely to guide the creation and 
strengthening of state labour regulatory power.145 
The emergence of codes of conduct must thus be seen as part of what is a 
much more complex phenomenon. Different attempts to define, categorize, 
and  qualify corporate codes of conduct can only result in highlighting all 
those questions that are connected to the issues of voluntariness, 
nonenforcement, minimum standards, and self-commitment. To adequately 
unfold the many dimensions of the phenomenon of private law making, we 
must reach beyond this straightforward, legalistic inquiry into the legal and 
nonlegal nature of voluntary codes. Where we focus on soft law, core labor 
rights, and the alleged privatization of the labor-law-making process, we are 
bound to take a decisively negative viewpoint on the contemporary 
regulatory landscape.146 The alternative perspective would be more 
realistic.147 What this inquiry could lead to, eventually, would be a renewal 
                                            
 145. Blackett, supra note 136, at 121. 
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of those normative promises that informed labor law from its beginnings, 
while reconstructing them in view of the changes in the regulatory 
environment as they have been described. A juxtaposition of the allegedly 
private vices of voluntary codes of conduct with the public virtues of an 
effectively functioning, protective labor law regime can be validated only in 
this regard. Where it helps to initiate renewed deliberations over the 
protective scope of labor law norms, instead of condemning all forms of soft 
law outright, the juxtaposition of private and public ordering could allow us 
to illuminate the shortcomings and preoccupations on both sides. 
4. Public Versus Private Regulation: Can Globalization Be “Fair”? 
In order to further assess the regulatory environment in which we see the 
emergence of corporate codes of conduct, we need to widen the perspective 
still more. In February 2004, the World Commission for the Social 
Dimension of Globalization issued a 190-page report, “A Fair Globalization: 
Creating Opportunities for All.”148 The Commission was initiated by the ILO 
in 2002 and produced a wide-ranging analysis as well as recommendations 
on globalization’s much-disputed “discontents,” such as poverty, inequality, 
and exclusion.149 While the report embraces highly advanced ideas of 
decentralized law making and responsive regulation, some authors recognize 
that risks lie in focusing on the promotion of labor standards while 
decoupling this process from the existing law-making and supervisory 
mechanisms in the ILO.150 Their intention to instead preserve a strong role 
for the tripartite negotiation framework at the ILO could invite equal 
amounts of critique and applause. The problem, however, lies elsewhere. No 
adequate assessment of the regulatory models as suggested in the 
Commission’s report is possible when the substantive discussion over the 
need for an effective labor law regime is decoupled from the wider range of 
regulatory changes that characterize the attempts to consolidate and protect 
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rights of workers in a globally integrated marketplace. Namely, seen in light 
of current regulatory changes in labor law making that are defined by a 
seemingly irreversible trend to company level negotiation and minimum 
standards, the report’s authors went to great lengths in defining their 
approach to addressing the regulatory challenge that labor law faces today. 
The Commission can in fact be seen as embracing a decentralized and highly 
diversified public-private policy mix. As such, the report cannot be imagined 
without keeping in mind prior experiences with the United Nations Global 
Compact151 and the more recent Draft Norms on Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations.152  
When compared to developments in regulatory regimes elsewhere, we 
are increasingly able to understand the similarity between the rights 
protection regime in labor law and other areas of globalized law.153 We find 
that problems of procedure, norm generation, and enforcement must be seen 
in close connection to the substantive area in which they are developed. It is 
only when these different dimensions are conflated that ideology can make 
us blind to the complexity of the challenge.154 Even the most dedicated labor 
lawyers express their positive (or perhaps optimistic) expectations toward the 
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current development in transnational labor law making.155 But, they also 
point to the dramatic risks inherent in this process: without long-term-
oriented institution building, workers as vulnerable contract partners might 
before long become subjected to market forces without any effective defense 
instruments to aid them.  
5. Legal Rhetoric and the Move Away from Formalism 
What remains crucial is the assessment of times and places when and 
where a certain legal program is being promoted and the rhetoric that is 
being employed to that effect. Law making never takes place in a void. 
Instead, the tension that we can perceive in the area of international labor law 
between state regulation and monitoring, on the one hand, and soft law, core 
labor rights, and corporate self-regulation, on the other, can be seen as 
resonating with a much larger trend in contemporary international legal 
thinking. As Martti Koskenniemi brilliantly argued, the current state of 
theorizing in international law—in particular on the issue of humanitarian 
intervention and the “war against terror”—is characterized by a “turn to 
ethics” and an ironic reversal of the normal and the exception.156 We tend to 
disregard the normal and to take it as given, natural, and ultimately neutral. 
Only the exception challenges us, and only in mobilizing an ethical response 
to the perceived horrors of the world do we proclaim universal standards and 
solidarity. We intervene in other countries based on a very vaguely defined 
ethical agenda and thereby forget the everyday injustice that has always been 
and to the continuance of which we greatly contribute.157 
One finds it hard to dissociate this observation from assessments of the 
developments in international economic law, the WTO, the World Bank, and 
the IMF. In both general public international law and international economic 
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law we appear to be facing erosions of formalism.158 Instead, we find policy 
agendas that cover macro- and microeconomic adjustment as conditions for 
funds and loans.159 This development is largely principle and policy driven, 
and it functions—to a large degree—without formal rules. Almost 
imperceptibly, the global marketplace begins to represent elements of a 
political “New World Order.”160 But, while its protagonists aspire to the 
transnational emergence of networks and civil society bodies engaging in 
global deliberations,161 the new world order could elevate the struggle over 
political values to an abstract level where decisions are taken over liberal and 
non-liberal states, good states and rogue states. An ethical turn could 
dissociate decision-making processes from any procedural critique of how 
this process is composed and into which larger regimes of law creation, law 
enforcement, and power distribution it is embedded. 
 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Transnational Advantage 
It is here that we need to contemplate the particular quality and role of 
law in this process today. Our previous examination of the actors and 
decentralized law making processes enables us to take a closer look at 
current forms of multilevel and multipolar regulatory governance. As 
suggested above, the norms that shape the constitution of the firm and those 
that form the body of labor law for the worldwide activity of business 
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corporations and their employees are transnational in nature. Although 
numerous accounts of the scope and content of transnational law (TL) exist, 
the following sketch shall carve out the essential ideas as they apply to our 
theme of the separate worlds of corporate governance and labor law. 
The first usage of the term TL continues to be disputed. While 
scholarship focused on the origins of the term for a long time, it has since 
become apparent that the real challenge of TL lies in its scope and 
conceptual aspiration.162 Within an interdisciplinary research agenda 
concerning the transformation of globalized law, TL offers itself as a 
supplementing and challenging category. Famously conceptualized in a 
series of lectures by Philip Jessup at Yale Law School in 1956,163 TL “breaks 
the frames” (Teubner) of traditional thinking about interstate relationships by 
pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations among state and 
non-state actors. 
Jessup writes that he “shall use . . . the term ‘transnational law’ to include 
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. 
Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules 
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”164 When examining 
the inescapable “problem” of people worldwide whose lives are “affected by 
rules,” Jessup points to the striking contingency by “which we attribute the 
label of ‘law’ to rules, norms or customs that govern various situations.” It is 
the hallmark of TL to identify the hidden agendas and the blind spots of 
traditional regulatory law understandings. These are marked by clear 
assignments of law-making authority to certain institutions and a clear view 
of which norms of societal guidance are to be recognized as legal rules. In 
contrast, TL suggests a widening of the law-making agenda and of our 
understanding of law as such. TL emerges from the increasingly interlocking 
spheres of societal norm production by public, official and private, unofficial 
norm-setting agencies and actors. 
Based on such an expanded understanding of law, TL has begun to reach 
deep into the heart of contemporary struggles over the role of law within 
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dispersed and fragmented spaces and places of norm production.165 TL 
reminds us of the very fragility and unattainedness of law. At the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, we are still at a loss to identify a theory of law 
that would be subtle enough not to stifle emerging identities in a post-
colonial era,166 while providing “forms, fora, and processes”167 for the 
collision of discourses that mark post-metaphysical legal thinking.168 It is 
against this background that our search continues for a legal theory that 
could adequately describe the complex regulatory environment identified 
earlier.  
The transnational perspective on law allows us to identify the 
dehierarchized law-making processes across national borders.169 Building on 
Saskia Sassen’s and Sousa Santos’s work on the importance of the study of 
places and spaces of regulation,170 we can begin to discern the regulatory 
groundwork of globally integrated markets. Seen through a governance lens 
that parallels both the emerging governance structures and discourses on the 
national, transnational, and global level, the “domestic face of 
globalization”171 becomes apparent, and “globalization” loses much of its 
supposedly foreign, “outside” character. And it is through the realization of 
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similarities of legal and political struggles in other places that the shared 
place between those and our struggles becomes visible. It is against this 
background that the study of corporate codes of conduct may alert us to the 
challenges of empowering workers in fragmented workplace realities that 
have been moved out of the reach of national regimes of labor law 
protection. 
The task, therefore, is to create a transnational regulatory 
framework which encourages and develops the potential of 
TNCs to raise the labour standards of economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups of workers and producers, 
particularly in the informal sector. At national level, the 
application and elaboration of this framework has to take 
account of the specific local cultural, social and economic 
features. We must, therefore, evaluate the emerging methods 
of transnational labour regulation according to their potential 
for the dissemination of “best practices” and for developing 
solidarity between workers employed by TNCs in different 
countries.172 
TL thus illuminates the parallels between fragmented regulatory 
developments that no longer follow only the rules of state-based, statutory 
law making and enforcement through courts. At the same time, the 
transnational law of codes of conduct recalls the regulatory experiences 
within a specific, national regulatory environment, which regularly consists 
of contested strands of law, culture, and socioeconomic struggles.173 In this 
vein, TL contains the narratives of law’s past as it is embedded in national 
histories of law as an instrument of social change.174 TL, then, can be seen as 
always aspiring to form a stable body of law, while it constantly unfolds as a 
regulatory experiment in a multipolar and multilevel socioeconomic 
environment. In that respect, the study of TL can sharpen our perception 
against the creation of allegedly “new rights,” values, and principles that are 
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being presented as something different from the regulatory rules and statutes 
that legal theory has been concerned with all along.  
TL offers itself as a critique of the promises of private ordering 
increasingly detached from processes of legitimation and political 
accountability. From this perspective, the transnational law of labor law 
rights is in its infancy.175 For the time being, corporate codes of conduct 
appear to move forward at best a reductionist and complementary concept of 
labor law, where workers’ rights are subjected to a wider corporate agenda of 
social responsibility instead of being developed within an effective 
regulatory framework of labor law. Meanwhile, in avoiding effective 
political regulation through national governments or international bodies, 
corporate codes of conduct remain regulatory instruments not in the hands of 
those they are purportedly meant to protect but in the hands of their 
corporate authors alone.  
While the localized regulation of corporate activity echoes earlier hopes 
of the advantages of decentralized governance in a wider system of 
regulatory competition,176 corporate codes of conduct will not enable 
workers to develop a sustainable regime of protected rights if they are not 
embedded in a sensitive and adequately responsive system of monitoring and 
revision. It is here where the spatial concept of public fora, organized in the 
vicinity of localized corporate activity, allows us to see the connections 
between different awareness initiatives by consumer groups, political 
activists, lobbying groups, and non-governmental organizations.177 From a 
methodological point of view, an effective supervision and control of code 
production and of the rights they endorse will require continuous monitoring 
efforts. Proposals such as a “rolling rule regulation,” by Sabel, O’Rourke, 
and Fung address the regulatory challenge that follows from a highly 
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dynamic and asymmetrically structured law-making process.178 At the same 
time, we need to assess the regulatory potential of such proposals in light of 
the aforementioned importance of integrating prior regulatory experiences 
and struggles over democratic governance into our contemporary design of a 
regulatory framework for labor law. 
In the light of these challenges of decentralized and fragmented public 
fora, the political imagination undergoes dramatic adaptations. 
Consequently, the form and substance of the political process need to be 
reconsidered in light of dramatically increased problems of representation 
and identity issues.179 These must be seen as both the burden and the heritage 
of the “global bukowina.”180 No “law without the state” ought to be 
developed in a state of amnesia as regards the underlying and continuing 
distributive issues with which labor law has always been concerned.181 
Accordingly, TL can help us recognize and assess pervasive discourses of 
legitimacy of the new world order in different fields of law. For example, in 
the law of corporate governance, we see that the current assertion of a 
globalized convergence to shareholder-value thinking tends to overlook 
many existing differences, even within different trajectories of capitalism.182  
The differentiated picture that has been sketched in this paper owes much 
to the “Varieties of Capitalism” school, which has been casting a wider 
perspective on legal and socioeconomic institutions in order to better 
understand the trajectories of institutional change in the political economy of 
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states.183 With regard to labor laws, this perspective allows us a richer 
understanding of the regulatory environment: “[labor] laws are but one 
element of a wider political economy that includes industrial relations, 
corporate governance, vocational education and training, and inter-firm 
relations.”184 And yet corporate governance, as it permeates the 
contemporary world of corporate self-regulation, is entirely informed by a 
global focus on investor protection: the definition of the business 
corporation, as much as the applicable laws, remains confined to a very 
narrow concept and understanding of corporate governance without 
accounting for the larger political economy in which both are embedded. It is 
here where new comparative research has taken its cue from the “Varieties of 
Capitalism” school while taking into account the “degree of recent political 
economic change that has occurred in recent years and the intensely political 
processes that construct corporate governance regimes.”185 
The decoupling of corporate self-regulation and the ensuing privatization 
of labor law norm-setting standards seems to seriously frustrate any hopes of 
improving the ailing situation of labor law regulation.186 In light of the larger 
trend toward deformalization in public international law, a (admittedly very) 
pessimistic reading would qualify any strengthening of labor rights and of 
workers’ participation in corporate governance as an exception to the norm, 
as something to be ethically considered, if at all. Workers’ rights would 
increasingly be seen as excluded from the “normal” realm of labor law on 
the one side and from the reach of corporate law on the other. Finally, as 
workers’ rights become part of the voluntary ethics codes of a corporation, 
there is the risk they fall outside the reach of a more effectively enforceable 
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regulation. In contrast, a more optimistic reading that would focus on the 
potential of a continuing supervision by transnational civil society actors 
faces the above-described challenges of providing for effectively linked, 
transnational monitoring and supervising instruments. 
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B. Transnational Law and Constitutionalization 
“Law is important—but cannot be all there is, 
and it does not operate only in one way.”187 
 
Some distance from the crystal palaces of transnational legal theory, 
survival battles over the resistance of labor laws to neoliberal agendas of 
economic globalization are being waged, and these battles serve as a constant 
reminder of how much depends on their outcome. In an angry article 
addressing the World Commission Report of February 2004 on the “Social 
Dimensions of Globalization,” Philip Alston and James Heenan discerned an 
emerging trend in constitutional thinking, which denies regulatory 
intervention.188 It comes as no surprise that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lochner v. New York189 in 1905 serves as the case in point here, 
although notably and regrettably not Holmes’s dissent. While American 
politics and jurisprudence did in many ways take a critical stance towards 
Lochner in subsequent years,190 this reversal seems to be forthcoming. 
Alston and Heenan fear that, in the wave of antiregulatory politics and 
nurtured by an ideologically self-righteous neoliberal agenda, the Lochner 
Court might now be seen to have promoted better “economic theory” when it 
interpreted the due process clause as endorsing the principle of freedom of 
contract, something that Holmes so powerfully deconstructed in his dissent. 
All is in the present, and the past is forgotten. With it, all the lessons of the 
past seem to be forgotten as well; the lessons from Holmes’s dissent have 
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powerfully and rightly been drawn, for example, by the American realists191 
but also by current work in law and development.192  
In recalling the way in which Holmes deciphered the Court’s embrace of 
abstract principles and its deduced legal rules from abstract principles, we 
can return to the wonderful story told by Felix Cohen about Rudolf von 
Jhering’s dream of being in a heaven of abstract notions.193 In his dissent, 
Justice Holmes convincingly pointed out that nothing can be seen as either 
being entailed or excluded by way of concrete outcomes from the 
recognition of rights in the abstract form. Rights, as such, are not a guarantee 
of either legal or social transformation: it is only at the level of practice, 
typically in the context of a specific dispute, that their uses are determined.194 
The core of the debate over corporate codes of conduct must be 
discovered in the underlying understanding of the law. This core is 
explosive, as it can again be split. On the one hand, we find formalism, a 
discourse on “rights” and on law as assigned power. On the other hand, we 
find the embeddedness of law. Here, we find law as embedded in the greater 
political economy of its last battle against a globalized corporate Moloch. 
But these distinctions betray their own impossibility as well as their 
ideological motivation. Certainly, then, we find excitement and unrest on 
both sides: Brian Langille, himself a long-standing expert on international 
labor law and the ILO, rejects Alston’s lament that core labor rights 
undermine the formerly endeared promise of global labor rights195 as 
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promoted by the ILO as “romanticism” and “hallucination.”196 Laws exist, 
Langille posits, “not as ends in themselves but for the welfare of society.”197 
True, but what does that mean? Langille’s argument, while being presented 
as forcefully as the one he opposes, proceeds indirectly, making passes 
through neighboring territory to show that one needs to take a wider view on 
things. The procession of the argument is simple, straightforward, and, at the 
same time, very sophisticated. It is, indeed, both authors’—Alston’s and 
Langille’s—approach to the issue that will likely make this dispute one that 
will retain currency in the discussion over the ILO and the nature of the 
international labor law regime in the years to come—not to mention its value 
for a legal theory seminar on legal argumentation.  
Countering Alston’s concern about the ILO losing its influential position 
in the shaping of an international labor law regime, Langille smartly 
responds, “I have never heard anyone, inside the ILO or out, claim that the 
ILO was at centre stage in any meaningful sense.”198 In this part of the 
argument we can recognize the operation of elements of space.199 For Alston, 
the ILO’s loss of its important position in the space of labor law regulation is 
ascribed to its embrace of neo-liberally induced core labor rights that will, 
according to Alston, replace an allegedly more effective system of rights 
protection under the auspices of the ILO in Geneva.200 Langille continues to 
operate in spatial imagery in order to identify Alston’s very premise as false. 
Rejecting the ILO’s occupation of a central regulatory place and, instead, 
situating the ILO at the margins  of global market regulation, Langille 
prepares the ground for his substantively more positive assessment of the 
ILO’s core labor rights program. Langille situates the ILO at some hard spot 
in the complex regulatory, multilevel environment of international labor law 
in order to further illuminate the regulatory challenge that the ILO faces.  
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The idea that there is a centre stage and that it is located in 
Geneva is probably a bad idea to start with. The international 
labor law regime is probably, and probably always was, much 
better regarded as a very complex motley of actors, sites of 
contest, modes of action, at different levels, etc., probably 
without a single centre and shifting overtime.201  
In his reply, Alston sticks to the space and centrality perspective to reflect on 
the importance of the ILO in shaping the international labor law regime—
from Geneva into the world through its manifold communications to national 
labor law regulators.202 
From within the critique of the space imagery employed by Alston, 
Langille moves to the legal core of the dispute over core labor rights. Where 
Alston suspects that the ILO—through its 1998 Declaration—conducted a 
shift from rights to principles, Langille interprets the ILO’s embrace of 
principles (“freedoms”) in its Declaration as a clear sign for just the opposite 
movement, reading this as “a shift from international labor standards to 
international labour/human rights.”203 Alston replies that the ILO and 
existing labor law retain enough rights and that “a wide range of corporate 
and other actors need to be mobilized in that endeavor.”204 To this, Langille 
responds that, in fact, the ILO’s embrace of standards and core labor rights is 
not only in line with the ILO’s traditional mode of norm setting, but that the 
1998 Declaration can also be seen as faring more successfully in the overall 
implementation programs through Member States.205 “The fact is that the 
techniques at the ILO were and are soft.”206 With conventions now 
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encompassing standards over long and detailed lists of rights to be ratified, 
the result is that the newer conventions get overwhelmingly ratified.207 
In order to identify the problem posed by those suspicious that the 
introduction of human rights standards in the international labor law regime 
represents merely an inside attack on the labor law regime, Langille builds 
on208 the “‘capability’ theory” that Amartya Sen had developed in his book 
Development as Freedom.209 Applying Sen’s approaches, Langille 
contemplates shifting the perspective in legal regulation: “Promotion is not a 
bad substitute for ‘enforcement’.”210 The intriguing thrust of Langille’s 
argument of promoting human freedom is that the introduction of labor 
standards might help countries to reflect on what their real interest is in 
protecting and promoting human freedom. And it is this task that others will 
hold them accountable for.211 When confronted, it turns out that both sides 
share more than was visible at first. Alston points out that the core of the 
international human rights regime is not, and has never been, about 
“enforcement.”212 Instead, the main thrust of international human rights is 
about “empowerment and mobilization.”213 With regard to the ILO, this 
points in the direction of further institutional and procedural reform, 
allowing the Organization to become more responsive and susceptible to 
“new actors including corporations and those promulgating codes of 
conduct.”214 
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This multilevel and multipolar regulatory environment forms the 
framework in which we can observe the emergence of overlapping legal 
discourses such as labor law and human rights, hard and soft law, or labor 
law and corporate governance. Shining through these discourses we may 
hope to find traces of constitutional law with regard to determination of a 
new legitimacy basis for the dramatic developments in regulatory 
governance. Constitutions easily become fetishes, concepts of silencing, or 
overwhelming authority, as they embody values and principles in a highly 
abstract manner. It is this tension, which informs the contemporary 
assessments of constitutionalization of TL.215 But, can we dismiss any 
thought of constitutional thinking when we are asked to reevaluate the 
boundaries of private laws with a public function?216  
It is one of the great legacies of the early beginnings of American legal 
realism to have argued that the dissociation of abstract principles from their 
real-life application reifies the former while providing no satisfactory 
explanation for the latter. The isolation of constitutional values from their 
practice (Holmes) leads us to forget (1) the institutional framework in which 
the constitution has been interpreted and functioning all along, and (2) the 
distributive effects of the legal and socioeconomic environment in which the 
constitution, or, for that matter, any other statute or norm has been 
interpreted. This means for core labor standards that they too are not 
different from regulation; they are just another form of regulation, and they 
have to be analyzed with the same analytical framework that we hold as 
adequate elsewhere. 
Where self-regulation has the effect of placing workers at the mercy of 
management without the availability of institutional safeguards, this form of 
private ordering remains deficient. It is then not through the revival of 
traditional forms of collective bargaining, as were available in the post-war 
labor law regimes, but through new modes of interest representation, 
monitoring, and the securing of transparency that first steps towards the 
reestablishment of workers’ voice and participation may be taken. But, even 
while much seems to suggest that we must turn our attention to the viable 
                                            
 215. See Teubner, supra note 47. For a critique, see David Schneiderman, Investment Rules 
and the New Constitutionalism, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2000). 
 216. See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 
704 (1931). 
2006] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR LAW 59 
 
role that can be played by a wider circle of interest groups, the break with 
prior existing forms of collective bargaining again becomes painfully 
evident. Indeed, where self-regulating multinational corporations and their 
codes of conduct can be seen to render the loss of entitlement and 
participation rights invisible, corporate codes of conduct will remain 
unsatisfactory instruments of workers’ empowerment. 
Placing an abstract idea of market self-regulation in opposition to the 
idea of state intervention makes either of these nonsensical. Furthermore, it 
assumes they are something different. Yet, the market itself is not 
unregulated.217 Instead, the market produces distributions of outcomes and 
power through the actors and norms operating in it. The appeal of corporate 
social responsibility and of labor norms incorporated in corporate codes of 
conduct can be seen in the fact that they are commonly assumed to be neutral 
and “nonregulatory.” By allegedly being mere principles instead of 
conflictual rights, they are not seen as impeding on the otherwise performed 
discretion of a market regulator. 
Against this background, how can we describe an alternative vision of 
constitutionalizing the TL of corporate governance and of labor laws? 
Attaining a more effective protection of workers’ rights would take a 
courageous and yet careful approach to multilevel, decentralized, and mixed 
public and private governance. Its approach would have to be courageous in 
its embrace of the exhaustion of traditional nation-state based or—on the 
international level—state-based regulatory institutional approaches in favor 
of context-sensitive models of reflexive law and responsive regulation. At 
the same time, it would need to be careful in remaining aware of the 
preceding and continuing political and social struggles over participation, 
representation, entitlement, voice and exit, and, eventually, loyalty.218 It 
would, furthermore, have to be careful and sensitive of the continuing 
challenge in translating constitutional visions developed in a different 
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regulatory and socioeconomic environment onto the transnational level.219 
This sensitivity would have to allow for awareness of the continuing tension 
between the daily, awfully quiet and routine practice of law and its 
increasing moments of crisis, emergency, and exception. The development of 
a constitutional dimension of TL would then perhaps allow us to remember 
that at the outset of a decision for or against a regulatory option, there is 
always a normative dilemma.220 That dilemma still exists regardless of which 
regulatory approach is resolved upon in the end. The undeniable dilemma—a 
dilemma that lies at the heart of the debate over core labor rights and 
corporate codes of conduct, the “Trade and . . .” discussions, the struggle 
over the rule of law projects of the World Bank, the policy recommendations 
by the IMF, and also of the worldwide discussion over the alleged 
convergence of corporate governance systems towards a shareholder-value-
oriented model all involve many questions. These questions include: whether 
and which role workers are to play in the constitution of the firm; whether 
workers’ financial, safety and organizational rights must be seen in 
connection with the promotion of trade policy; whether financial stability as 
a policy requirement for international financial aid is meant to include 
respect for a country’s political choices for or against a strong welfare 
system; or whether financial stability can only be achieved through politics 
of privatization and deregulation.  
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